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RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The county makes assertions on pages 6 and 7 of its 
appellee's brief to the effect that the criminal charges 
against Sheriff Meacham arose out of a contract between the 
United States Forest Service and Uintah County. Appellant, 
DeLandfs, response in the trial court was that these 
assertions are immaterial. 
The essential fact, as stated by DeLand below, is that 
"members of the Uintah County Sheriff's Department were 
engaged by Uintah County and paid through the Uintah County 
Treasurer to perform the work of peace officers. The fact 
that Uintah County had a separate contract with the Forest 
Service which reimbursed it for these or any such payments is 
immaterial to the issues presented in this litigation." (R. 
233). 
Moreover, the county's references on pages 6 and 7 of 
appellee's brief to the opening statement of the prosecution 
at the preliminary hearing of Sheriff Meacham constitutes 
scant evidence. (See references to R. 175). Nevertheless, 
assuming such factual assertions to be correct, Mr. DeLand 
asserts again on appeal that such evidence, even if not 
controverted, is immaterial to this litigation. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Reimbursement of defense costs is appropriate with 
respect to each count of an information which is dismissed. 
1 
Nothing within the plain language of § 63-30a-2, U.C.A., 
requires "complete dismissal" of a multi-count information in 
order to call for reimbursement. The more sensible and fair 
interpretation is to provide for reimbursement of attorney's 
fees, as may be determined, for each count dismissed. The 
fact that more than one count may be joined as part of a 
"single criminal episode" is irrelevant. The case cited by 
the County for illumination of legislative history, Hulbert v. 
State, 607 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1980), is of no precedential value, 
as all charges against Hulbert were dismissed. There is no 
authority for the county's argument that "complete 
vindication" by dismissal of all counts of a multi-count 
information is required by § 63-30a-2, U.C.A. As to those 
counts which are dismissed there is complete vindication and 
reimbursement of defense costs should be provided. 
II. The information was filed against Sheriff Meacham in 
connection with or arising out of an act or omission of 
Sheriff Meacham during the performance of his duties, within 
the scope of his employment or under color of his authority. 
The county seems to be arguing that if Sheriff Meacham 
committed any illegal act, he was not acting within the course 
of employment. Appellant's position is that but for the fact 
that the information alleged acts or omissions in connection 
with the course and scope of his employment, or under color of 
authority, Sheriff Meacham would not have been charged with 
2 
felony misuse of public moneys. The allegations themselves 
require that he be a "public officer" and such charges could 
not otherwise arise but under color of authority. The fact 
that the charges were unfounded and dismissed do not alter the 
fact that he was a public officer and was charged as a result 
thereof and therefore charged "in connection" with alleged 
acts or omissions occurring under color of authority. The 
reimbursement statute is therefore satisfied. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING ATTORNEY'S 
FEES WITH RESPECT TO CHARGES DISMISSED AGAINST 
SHERIFF MEACHAM. 
A. The plain language of § 63-30a-2, U.C.A., does not 
require complete dismissal of a multi-count information in 
order to trigger reimbursement. 
Both appellant and appellee agree on the law in Utah with 
regard to statutory construction. The primary objective of 
courts in interpreting the plain language of a legislative 
enactment is to give effect to the legislature's intent. 
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins, Co. v. Clyde, 920 P.2d 1183, 1186 
(Utah 1996). 
The legislature in its enactment of § 63-30a-2, U.C.A., 
said nothing with respect to situations giving rise to multi-
count informations, nor did it attempt to formulate any 
theories of possible recovery wherein the charges brought 
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arose from a "single criminal episode." The statute simply 
does not specifically address itself to multi-count 
informations. 
That fact however does not preclude a logical, sensible 
interpretation, within the plain meaning of the statute, that 
where multiple offenses are alleged in a multi-count 
information, the public employee is entitled to recover 
attorneyfs fees regarding the counts, "informations" as it 
were, which are dismissed or result in acquittal. As used in 
§ 63-30a-2, U.C.A., for purposes of multi-count informations, 
the word "information" means in effect each count of the 
information. The reimbursement statute is as much or more 
amenable to this interpretation as to that which the county 
urges. 
Uintah County's analysis along the lines of "single 
criminal episode" is more confusing than helpful. Appellee's 
position, by interjecting the "single criminal episode" 
concept, is a red herring and fosters a reading of the statute 
which the legislature clearly did not intend. The county's 
argument is that if a public employee is charged with many 
counts related to a single criminal episode, required to be 
filed in a single document, that document being entitled an 
"Information", no matter how meritorious the public employee's 
defense of all counts, save perhaps one, if all other counts 
are dismissed save the one, the public employee should not 
4 
recover attorney's fees for all the others which were 
dismissed. Such construction renders the statute 
"unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in blatant 
contravention of the express purpose of the statute." State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Clyde, supra, at 1186. 
The central fact which should be borne in mind relative 
to dismissed counts is that the accused, as a matter of law 
and common sense, did not commit the offense alleged. This is 
what the court in the criminal matter involving Sheriff 
Meacham ruled in dismissing the misuse of public money felony 
counts: he did not commit this offense. The acts or omissions 
giving rise to this offense did not take place; that is why it 
was dismissed. The legal status of the dismissed charge is no 
different where it is one count of many, than it would be as 
a separate free standing one count information. 
So, whether the allegation was one of several arising 
from a "single criminal episode" or was one of several which 
did not, the fact remains: Sheriff Meacham did not commit the 
felony crimes alleged. There was no factual support to find 
him guilty. That is why they were dismissed. That is why he 
is entitled to reimbursement for his defense of these 
dismissed charges. 
B. The legislative history of § 63-30a-2, U.C.A., 
demonstrates a legislative intent to reimburse a public 
employee's legal fees when he has prevailed. 
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The county goes to great length to somehow establish that 
Hulbert v. State, 607 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1980), should be applied 
prospectively in some fashion because "the court in Hulbert 
noted that 'the result of this vigorous defense was the 
exoneration of plaintiff on all 12 indictments.f". 
(Appellee's Brief, p. 16) This clarifies nothing. Had Mr. 
Hulbert been charged in a single indictment with 12 separate 
counts, all of which he was acquitted, the result no doubt 
would have been the same. 
Had Mr. Hulbert been convicted on one of the indictments, 
would the Supreme Court still have applied § 63-30a-2, U.C.A., 
retroactively? It would be speculation to assert that the 
court would or would not have done so based on the decision in 
Hulbert. Likewise, had Mr. Hulbert been charged in 12 counts 
joined in a single information, all but one of which were 
dismissed, it would be equally speculative to attempt to guess 
what the court would have ruled as Hulbert does not address 
the issue at all. Thus, Hulbert v. State has dubious 
precedential value to the case at hand. 
The county also attempts to engraft sections of the 
public employees civil reimbursement statutes, § 63-30-36 and 
§ 63-30-37, U.C.A., onto the criminal reimbursement statute, 
§ 63-30-a-2, U.C.A. The two statutory schemes are apples and 
oranges. They deal with separate and distinct circumstances. 
6 
For example, under Chapter 30 the civil employee is not 
entitled to be provided a defense, or reimbursement for a 
defense if the entity refuses to defend, if the injury or 
damage resulted from fraud or malice of the employee (§ 63-30-
36(3)(b), U.C.A.) or resulted from injury or damage on which 
the claim resulted from the employee driving under the 
influence of alcohol or controlled substances (§ 63-30-
36(3)(c), U.C.A.). 
Chapter 30a with respect to reimbursement of legal fees 
and costs to officers and employees has no similar limitations 
or restrictions. Chapter 30a deals with charges of criminal 
behavior and only if the public employee obtains a dismissal 
or acquittal may he recover. The two enactments deal with 
separate and distinct circumstances. Confusion can only 
result from attempting a comparison, drawing conclusions from, 
or engrafting portions of one upon the other. Extrapolating 
from what is said in the civil reimbursement statute to 
explain whatever the county feels should have been, but 
clearly was not, stated in the criminal reimbursement statute 
is more confusing than helpful. 
The appellee's statement that it "would be unfair to 
allow Meacham reimbursement of his defense fees . . . when 
another county employee sued civilly because of fraudulent 
conduct, would not be allowed a defense at government 
expense." (Appellee's Brief, p. 17). First this statement 
7 
begs the questions of whether or not Mr. Meacham might not 
have been entitled to legal counsel and/or reimbursement for 
a defense of the particular charges under hypothetical 
circumstances. 
The felony charges were dismissed. So if a civil 
complaint containing like charges were likewise dismissed, why 
should he not be entitled to his attorney's fees? Moreover, 
assuming arguendo that he might be denied his fees in such a 
civil situation, that does not mean, under the separate 
criminal reimbursement statute, that it would be "unfair" to 
pay for a criminal defense. There is no realistic or helpful 
comparison between the two statutory schemes. 
The appellee cannot logically justify its statement that 
"[T]he legislative changes in 1987 [to the civil reimbursement 
statute] further limiting the situation when a governmental 
entity is required to defend an employee, support the narrow 
interpretation the trial judge made of § 63-30a-2. . . . " 
(Appellee's Brief, p. 17). It is difficult to understand in 
any sense how changes made to another statute, the civil 
reimbursement statute, could in any way effect the 
interpretation of the criminal reimbursement statute. 
Similar alterations could arguably have been made by the 
legislature to the criminal reimbursement statute, but 
specifically were not. No reference to the changes made in 
the civil reimbursement scheme was made by the legislature to 
8 
or from the criminal reimbursement statute. They are two 
distinct and separate statutes in substance and comparisons of 
the sort encouraged by the county can only result in 
confusion. The better argument is that since the legislature 
did not make similar changes to the criminal reimbursement 
statute, the legislature specifically intended no such changes 
to apply to it. 
C. The criminal reimbursement statute does not require a 
blanket "vindication". 
The county cites the plurality opinion in Salmon v. Davis 
County, 916 P.2d 890 (Utah 1996), for the proposition that 
there must be complete vindication (in the sense of having all 
counts of a multi-count indictment dismissed) of the public 
employee otherwise recovery may not be had. Nowhere in 
Salmon' s various opinions does such a statement or proposition 
appear. 
The facts in Salmon are that the defendant Salmon, a 
Davis County deputy sheriff was charged with two counts of 
assault. "Both counts arose out of actions allegedly taken by 
Salmon in the course of his employment." It is not entirely 
clear whether there were two counts filed in one information 
or actually two informations. (See Justice Durham's 
recitation of facts, Salmon at 891). At any rate, Salmon 
prevailed on each count and sued for attorney's fees. 
Nowhere in any of the plurality opinion is there any 
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statement to the effect that if Mr. Salmon had not prevailed 
on one of the informations, or one of the counts, that he 
should not be entitled to attorney's fees on the other. 
Complete vindication of the employee as a good person in a 
global sense is not necessary. Neither is it necessary in 
this particular situation involving Sheriff Meacham. 
As to the three felony counts against Sheriff Meacham 
which were dismissed upon motion of Mr. DeLand, he was 
completely vindicated. Reimbursement for his attorney's fees 
should consequently be allowed. 
POINT II 
THE INFORMATION WAS FILED AGAINST SHERIFF MEACHAM 
IN CONNECTION WITH OR ARISING OUT OF AN ACT OR 
OMISSION OF SHERIFF MEACHAM DURING THE PERFORMANCE 
OF HIS DUTIES, WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT 
OR UNDER COLOR OF HIS AUTHORITY. 
But for the fact that Sheriff Meacham was a public 
official the unfounded felony allegations could not have been 
leveled against him. The felony section he was criminally 
charged under, § 76-8-404, U.C.A., focuses its attention on 
"any public officer who shall make a profit out of public 
monies . . . ." The court in Meacham? s criminal case ruled 
that he did not commit this offense as a matter of law and 
dismissed. 
A reasonable interpretation of § 63-30a-2, U.C.A., would 
certainly be that if the allegations direct themselves to acts 
or omissions in connection with or arising out of performance 
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of duty, scope of employment or color of authority, the public 
employee is entitled to be reimbursed defense costs upon 
dismissal or acquittal. The facts of Salmon v. Davis Co., 
supra, fully bear this out. 
When a public officer, after having been acquitted of a 
criminal charge comes before the court to ask for 
reimbursement, it is because he has won the case, i.e., for 
one reason or another he is "vindicated" of the allegations 
lodged against him. Under one interpretation of the county's 
argument, the accused officer or employee would often be put 
in the position of having to prove his guilt with respect to 
the criminal allegations which had been dismissed by showing 
he committed the act alleged as a prerequisite to 
reimbursement. The argument being that if he didn't commit 
the act, it wasn't in the course of employment. This is, of 
course, an untenable position. Mr. Salmon, for instance, 
didn't commit assault, but the Supreme Court allowed his fees 
nonetheless. Salmon v. Davis Co., supra. 
The allegations in the felony matters charged against 
Sheriff Meacham set forth acts which were at the very least 
committed under color of authority. In Nielson v. Gurley, 888 
P.2d 130 (Ut. App. 1994), the appellate court described a 
failure of Officer Gurley to comply with regulations 
pertaining to any peace officer or special function officer as 
conduct that Gurley engaged in while in the performance of his 
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duties as a state employee and done under color of that 
authority. 888 P.2d at 134. Gurlev recognized that failing 
to do what is required by the job can be an act or omission 
occurring under color of authority. 
Color of authority is defined as "that semblance or 
presumption of authority sustaining the acts of a public 
officer which is derived from his apparent title to the office 
. . . ." Black!s Law Dictionary, Abridged 5th Edition. 
The statement of facts set forth by the county evince a 
course of action on the part of Sheriff Meacham, i.e., the 
submittal of time cards for the purpose of being paid by his 
employer, although more than he was entitled, which was 
clearly "in connection with" the performance of his duty and 
under color of his authority. Factually and legally, the acts 
or omissions of the sheriff in working for Uintah County as a 
public officer and accepting monies on its payroll or 
submitting time sheets for monies from the county treasurer as 
a public officer, were acts or omissions "in connection with 
or arising out of" his duties, employment, or under color of 
his authority as alleged in each of the felony counts. 
The fact that these acts may have been fraudulent does 
not thereby exclude them from being under color of authority. 
It has been specifically recognized that a public employee may 
participate in fraudulent acts within the scope of employment 
or under color of authority. For example, under the 
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governmental immunity act, § 63-30-4, U.C.A., a plaintiff may 
not bring or pursue a civil action or proceeding against the 
employee of a governmental entity unless the employee acted or 
failed to act through fraud or malice in the course and scope 
of his employment. § 63-30-4(3)(b)(i), U.C.A. See, Ross v. 
Schackel, 920 P.2d 1159, 1160, 1161-1162 & 1176 (Utah 1996); 
Baker v. Angus, 910 P.2d 427, ftn. 4 (Ct. App. 1996); DeBrv v. 
Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 442-443 (Utah 1995). If a fraudulent act 
of an employee, solely by virtue of the fraudulence, excluded 
it from being within the course and scope of employment, 
performance of duties, or under color of authority, this Utah 
statute and case law construing it would undoubtedly have so 
indicated. 
What Sheriff Meacham was accused of doing was profiting 
from public moneys under § 76-8-402, U.C.A. These felonies 
were dismissed. He did not commit these offenses. Had he 
done so, it would have been as a result of his office; it 
could not be otherwise. The county's argument that it was an 
ultra vires act is illogical in the context of the criminal 
reimbursement statute and would yield a result where no public 
employee or official could ever obtain reimbursement, viz., 
Mr. Salmon's alleged assault in Salmon v. Davis Co.. supra. 
The county's position that what Sheriff Meacham did or 
was alleged to have done was not in connection with or arising 
out of the performance of his duty, in the course and scope of 
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his employment, or under color of authority would clearly have 
excluded Mr. Salmon in Salmon v. Davis Co. , supra, from 
reimbursement of his attorney's fees, because assault is not 
an act done in the course and scope of employment. Again, the 
county continues to overlook the fact that Meacham obtained a 
dismissal. He did not commit the offense. 
If Sheriff Meacham had not allegedly been doing or 
failing to do something under color of his authority, or in 
connection with or arising out of the scope of his employment 
or the performance of his duties for Uintah County he would 
not have been charged under § 76-8-404, U.C.A. This should be 
sufficient to trigger the requirement of reimbursement once 
the Information is dismissed. 
Uintah County's argument is circular and contradictory. 
The county argues in essence that if the public employee is 
not convicted of the act charging him with violation arising 
under color of authority, then he could not have been acting 
under color of authority. It seems to be that only if Sheriff 
Meacham were convicted of the felony misuse of public monies, 
pursuant to the statute under which he was charged, could it 
be said then that he acted in connection with the performance 
of his duty, within the scope of his employment, or under 
color of authority. If he did not commit this crime, he did 
not so act. Yet the county maintains, if he did commit a 
crime, any crime, since what he did do was illegal, it could 
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not have been within the scope of employment, in the 
performance of duty, or under color of authority. This is a 
catch-22. 
The felony charges which were dismissed required as a 
premise that the individual be a public officer and that he 
profit as a result thereof. By definition the alleged crime 
would at least have to be committed under color of authority. 
It could occur in no other way. 
The examples appellee cites, Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 
771 P. 2d 1053 (Utah 1989), and J.H. by D.H. v. West Valley 
City, 840 P.2d 115 (Utah 1992), are inapposite. In both of 
these cases sexual abuse was the underlying offense committed 
by the public employee. Sheriff Meacham was not charged with 
any such thing so remote and removed from his employment. He 
was charged with profiting from his public employment, and by 
virtue of his public office. Those charges were dismissed. 
Nevertheless, but for the alleged acts in connection with the 
performance of his duty, scope of his employment, or color of 
his authority as a Uintah County Sheriff's Department officer, 
he could not and no doubt would not have been charged. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. DeLand should be reimbursed for the attorneyf s fees 
incurred by Sheriff Meacham pursuant to the assignment. The 
trial court should be reversed and this court should determine 
the further attorney's fees which Mr. DeLand is entitled to 
15 
for the necessity of bringing this appeal pursuant to Salmon 
v. Davis County, supra. 
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